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Nontechnical Summary
An increasing number of politicians regard globalization as a danger for the
attainment of domestic policy goals. In reaction to that some advocate tax
coordination or even restrictions to international capital mobility. While the
theoretical analysis of the impact of globalization on the government budget is
already advanced, the empirical analysis has not yet reached a comparable stage. For
the relatively few existing empirical studies two shortcomings are striking. First,
there is an analytical imbalance insofar most studies are solely concerned with the
development of government revenues. Second, many studies fail to identify
convincingly the impact of globalization on public finance.
With this background the approach of this study is the following: The impact of
globalization on different dimensions of government budgets – tax and expenditure
structure, public debt and size - is analyzed for OECD countries. The time
perspective is long-run as changes in fiscal variables from the 1970s to the 1990s are
analyzed. A central objective is to identify the multidimensional impact of
globalization on budgetary policy explicitly. For that purpose, globalization as
possible driving force for changes in government finance is identified in form of
variables on the existence of capital and current account restrictions, on the exposure
to international trade and the exchange rate regime.
The empirical tools employed are cluster and discriminant analysis. In a first step,
cluster analysis helps to identify fiscal country clusters, i.e. subgroups of the total
country sample with similar fiscal development in the last decades. In a second step,
the usefulness of globalization variables is tested in regard to their power to
discriminate between these clusters.
The results suggest that globalization has indeed an impact on government budgets
although this impact is limited and does not concern all budgetary dimensions. The
size of the budget is affected as predicted by theory. Countries with an early
liberalization of international transactions had lower increases of government
outlays and taxes. Nevertheless, even for the liberal countries there was relative to
GDP a substantial increase of government activity since the 1970s. This fact is
worth to be underlined since it contradicts the theoretical prediction of global
markets undermining the welfare state. Abolition of barriers to the free flow of
factors has limited the growth of the welfare state, but this growth remained positive
with high rates of expansion.
Compatibility of welfare state and globalization is also impressively demonstrated
by the findings concerning expenditure structure where public investment has been
reduced and social security expenditure shares have been increased. National
differences from this general tendency do not in all cases correspond to the relative
speed of opening. Those countries for which expenditure shift to social security has
been relatively small are even the countries that have been most reluctant to lift
restrictions on international transactions.
Concerning revenue structure there is some support for the predictions of tax
competition theory. Those countries that have been more globalized than others have
tended to shift relative tax burdens away from corporate income. Combined with the
fact of a high growth of government and especially social spending this indicates the
following: With globalization there are limits to finance an increasing welfare state
by higher tax burdens on mobile factors.
The results concerning public debt are disappointing for those who hope that open
capital markets can have a helpful disciplining function in the presence of the deficit
bias of modern democracies.  There is no indication that the abolition of capital
restrictions has limited the buildup of large debt levels since the 1970s. Different
clusters of debt performance can not be discriminated on the basis of globalization
variables.
As a whole the message of this analysis is: Globalization does indeed matter for
government budgets. However, substantial room for an individual national policy is
left.
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Abstract
Does globalization restrict the leeway for national budgetary policy? With the help
of cluster and discriminant analysis this study provides evidence on the basis of the
experience of OECD countries since the 1970s. Four budgetary dimensions are
included in the analysis: tax structure, expenditure structure, public debt and budget
size. Globalization as a potential driving force for changes in government finance is
identified in form of variables on the existence of capital and current account
restrictions, on the exposure to international trade and the exchange rate regime. The
results suggest that globalization does indeed matter for government budgets.
However, substantial room for an individual national policy particularly  in regard to
expenditure structure and public debt is left.
JEL-Classifications: H 60, H 87
Keywords: Fiscal Policy, Tax Competition,  Globalization, Cluster Analysis,
Discriminant Analysis
Acknowledgment
The author gratefully acknowledges financial support by the German Science Foundation (DFG)
within the research program „Governance in the European Union“. He also thanks Thiess Büttner,
ZEW and Olav Korn, University of Mannheim, for helpful comments and Gian Maria Milesi-
Ferretti, IMF, for the provision of data on legal restrictions to international transactions.
L 7, 1 Tel.: +621 / 1235 - 149
P.O. Box 10 34 43 Fax: +621 / 1235 - 223
D-68034 Mannheim E-mail: heinemann@zew.de
11 Introduction
The compatibility of national sovereignty and increasing global integration is at the
heart of the globalization debate. On the fiscal field the question is to what extent the
increasing mobility of production factors constrains budgetary policy. In Europe the
introduction of the Euro has intensified this debate since a further increase in the
mobility of real and financial capital is expected (Stirböck and Heinemann, 1999).
An increasing number of politicians regard liberalization as a danger for the
attainment of domestic policy goals e.g. on the social security field. In reaction to
that some advocate tax coordination or even restrictions to international capital
mobility.
While the theoretical analysis of the impact of globalization on the government
budget is already advanced, the empirical analysis has not yet reached a comparable
stage.1 For the existing empirical studies two shortcomings are striking. First, there
is an analytical imbalance insofar many studies are predominantly concerned with
the development of government revenues. The impact of factor mobility on the
complete government budget, i.e. in addition to revenues also expenditures and
public deficits is rarely taken into account in a comprehensive way.
Second, there are only few studies that try to measure the impact of globalization on
public finance explicitly. Frequently applied is the following approach: Trends in the
structure of revenues in the last decades are identified and significant changes are
then ascribed to globalization. Thus the implicit assumption of this traditional
approach is that the time scale is sufficient to measure the stage of globalization for
a country. This assumption is highly questionable. For different industrial countries
at a given point in time the extent of globalization has often been very different, e.g.
because of the existence of restrictions to international transactions.
This identification problem makes some conclusions of the literature to appear
premature since changes of fiscal structure might be motivated by reasons very
different from factor mobility. The decreasing share of corporate taxation in
government revenues of some countries can serve as an example. This empirical fact
seems to be in line with the prediction that with increasing mobility of some factors
the burden of taxation is shifted from the mobile to the immobile tax basis.
However, an alternative explanation exists: The reduction of taxes on enterprises has
been recommended by supply side economists in order to improve the environment
for investments and employment. Therefore, the tax shift away from corporate
taxation might – independently from tax competition and purely on domestic
grounds - be motivated by the desire to create a growth stimulating tax system.
                                       
1 For a recent survey see Schulze and Ursprung (1999).
2With this background the approach of this study is the following. The impact of
globalization on government budgets is analyzed in a multidimensional way: the
consequences of the OECD countries’ growing international integration are studied
for different dimensions of public finance – for the size of the budget, the tax
structure, the expenditure structure and the public debt. Theory suggests that these
dimensions could be affected. The time perspective is long-run as changes in fiscal
variables from the 1970s to the 1990s are analyzed.
Furthermore this approach follows the relative few studies that use explicit measures
of globalization. International integration as possible driving force for changes in
government finance is measured in form of variables on the existence of capital and
current account restrictions, on the size of international trade and the exchange rate
regime. Thus, an attempt is made to avoid the shortcomings of many existing
empirical studies and to take account of national differences in regard to
globalization exposure.
The empirical tools employed are cluster and discriminant analysis. In a first step,
cluster analysis helps to identify fiscal country clusters, i.e. subgroups of the total
country sample with similar fiscal development in the last decades. In a second step,
the usefulness of globalization variables is tested in regard to its power to
discriminate between these clusters.
The results suggest that globalization has indeed an impact on government budgets
although this impact is limited and does not concern all budgetary dimensions.
Growing international integration of a country has been associated with a relatively
low growth of government although this growth remained substantial in absolute
terms even for very globalized countries. The findings support the view that growing
market integration restricts the tax burden for corporate income. Substantial leeway
remains, however, on the expenditure side. Furthermore, the findings do not indicate
any effective globalization restrictions for public debt.
The paper proceeds with a short survey of the relevant theoretical and empirical
literature and the derivation of four testable hypotheses. In section 3, a description of
the relevant variables and the applied empirical methodology is given. After that
section 4 summarizes the empirical findings. These results serve as the basis for the
concluding section.
2 Four Hypotheses and Available Empirical Evidence
Globalization might have an impact on four dimensions of the government budget:
the revenue structure, the expenditure structure, the level of deficits and the level of
the budget. Among these four dimensions the revenue structure impact is – under the
heading of “tax competition” - the one most intensively analyzed in the theoretical
3public finance literature. 2 If capital is mobile and labor immobile and if the
expenditure side of the government budget does not have the character of a
production input, globalization will compete capital taxes down and lead to an
underprovision of public goods. With increasing globalization one would thus
expect the share of capital taxation to decrease and the share of taxes on immobile
factors to increase.
If, however, the expenditure side of the budget has a character of a production input,
the consequences of globalization on tax structure are less clear and lead to the
debate on the validity of models in the tradition of TIEBOUT (1956). In this model
local governments providing local public goods compete for mobile taxpayers
resulting in an efficient allocation. The assumptions of the TIEBOUT models are
highly controversial.  SINN (1994) among others rejects TIEBOUT due to its too
restrictive assumptions. However, the theoretical debate on tax competition and its
extension to the expenditure side of the budget leads to the identification of testable
hypotheses in regard to two government budget dimensions:
Tax structure hypothesis: Globalization forces governments to adjust the tax
structure. Taxes have to be shifted away from mobile to immobile factors.
Expenditure structure hypothesis: Globalization forces governments to adjust
expenditure structure. Expenditure shares must be relocated in order to benefit
rather the needs of mobile taxpaying factors at the cost of reducing benefits for
immobile taxpayers.
Adjusting the expenditure structure for the benefit of mobile taxpayers has the
character of a substitute to the adjustment of the revenue structure. Only empirical
analysis can find out which is the actually applied strategy of fiscal actors faced with
increasing mobility of some tax bases.
Globalization might not only be a relevant process for taxes and expenditures but
also for public debt. This interrelation has been touched in the debate on EMU and
public debt. LANE (1993) ascribes a disciplining function to open capital markets in
this context. If public debt exceeds the level that is sustainable, capital flight and
increasing risk premia are the consequence. The disciplining function of open capital
markets could, however, be neutralized if explicit or implicit bailout-mechanisms
are installed for a group of countries e.g. in the European Union. The following
hypothesis should be included in the empirical testing:
Public debt hypothesis: Globalization disciplines public debt policy. Governments
become increasingly unable to finance expenditure by issuing debt.
                                       
2 See Schulze and Ursprung (1999) for an non-technical summary of main results.
4With the effects of globalization on revenue sources discussed so far the expected
effect on the size of the government budget follows. Since tax competition and
increasing restrictions to public deficit make it harder to finance public expenditures
the outcome should be a shrinking budget.
Size hypothesis: Globalization restricts the size of government budgets.
What do fiscal developments in the last decades reveal about the validity of these
hypotheses? The findings of some analyses concerning size and structure of
government revenues of EU and OECD countries (LE CACHEUX, 1998, TANZI, 1998,
MONGELLI, 1997, BÜTTNER, 1999) can be summarized in the following way: The
level of government revenues does not give evidence for a negative impact of
globalization on the financial base of modern governments in the last years. On the
contrary, tax revenues (including social security contributions) expressed as a share
of  GDP have been rising for decades in OECD countries with a stabilization but no
reversal in the most recent years. The structure of government revenues is clearly
changing. Some of these changes are in line with theoretical predictions of a
growing burden for immobile factors: In recent years the share of indirect taxation is
increasing as it is the case for the share of social security contributions. The
prediction of a decreasing burden for mobile capital and companies can not be
clearly verified. While there is a tendency for corporate income and capital income
tax rates to be reduced this often is accompanied by a widening of the tax base.
There are clearly signs of convergence for corporate and capital taxation but so far
there seems to be no race to the bottom.
It has, however, to be stressed that the value of these analyses as evidence for the
impact of globalization is limited by the fact that the impact of globalization is not
adequately identified. The impact of globalization is not only a function of time
since the speed of globalization has been very different between OECD countries.
While some like the USA had already widely liberalized capital markets in the 60s,
others like the Southern Europeans did not abolish last restrictions before the
nineties.
SCHULZE and URSPRUNG (1999) cite a few empirical studies to which this criticism
does not apply because explicit globalization measures are taken into account. While
these study are silent on public debt effects they deal with the other three
dimensions: The clearest effect according to his survey is the impact on tax structure
while there is no strong evidence for the affection of expenditure structure and size
of government.
HEINEMANN (1999) looks into the determination of public deficits in  OECD
countries by panel regression and takes into account globalization variables such as
openness and existence of capital and current account restrictions. He finds some
support for the disciplining hypothesis.
5With this limited insights from the literature it is the aim of this empirical study to
provide evidence to what extent the above four hypotheses are supported when the
impact of globalization is identified by the use of appropriate indicators.
3 Variables, Data and Methodology
The following variables are used to measure developments along the four
dimensions that according to theory should be influenced by growing international
market integration:
Measuring tax structure
Tax structure is measured by taxes on corporate income as percentage of total
taxation and taxes on goods and services as percentage of total taxation. According
to the tax structure hypothesis with increasing globalization, tax shares are expected
to shift away from corporate income towards tax bases with a low mobility. General
consumption of goods and services is one of the less mobile tax bases.
Measuring expenditure structure
Expenditure structure is measured by government spending on social security as
percentage of total expenditure and government net investment as percentage of total
expenditure. Public investment seems to be the best proxy for public spending
shares that have an input character for private production. Social security
expenditures benefit the relatively immobile factor labor. Therefore, a shift away
from social spending towards investment spending would support the expenditure
structure hypothesis.
Measuring public debt
The stock and flow dimension of public debt is included by taking into account the
level of debt as a percentage of GDP and the primary surplus as percentage of GDP.
According to the public debt hypothesis both should react negatively to increasing
integration of markets.
Measuring size
Size is measured by total tax revenues including social security contributions as
percentage of GDP  and government outlays as percentage of GDP. With increasing
difficulties to raise revenues the size hypothesis should be supported and increasing
globalization should affect both variables negatively.
621 OECD countries are included in the database3. Due to missing variables not all
are included in each single analytical step. The data originate from OECD Revenue
Statistics and the OECD Fiscal Positions and Business Cycles data base. The focus
is on long-run changes of theses variables, i.e. changes from the average of the
seventies to the average of the nineties (with 1997 the last year included). Decade
averages are the basis for the measurement of long-run changes in order to limit
business cycle effects.
Globalization Indicators
Three variables are used to identify more clearly the impact of globalization.
Openness is defined as the ratio between the sum of ex- and imports and GDP. The
motivation for this variable is the idea that economies for which international trade
is of large importance will also be subject to more intense globalization constraints
than closed economies. For each country the average openness between 1970 and
1997 is the variable used below (OPENNESS).
Legal restrictions on international transactions reduce factor mobility and might thus
alleviate pressures on the government budget arising from tax competition or capital
flight. Therefore, the existence of legal restrictions as reported in Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions by the IMF is used as the basis for the
second globalization variable. Four kinds of restrictions are taken account of: the
existence of multiple exchange rates, restrictions on the current account, restrictions
on the capital account and the obligation to surrender export proceeds to government
authorities. For each country the variable RESTRICTIONS is calculated in a
straightforward way: for each year between 1970 and 1997 a country receives 0 to 4
points if there were zero up to all four kinds of restrictions, the yearly points are then
added over the whole period. Thus, a high value indicates a low degree of
globalization.
Finally, characteristics of the exchange rate regime are included. MCKINNON (1997)
regards the exchange rate regime as one of the important variables for fiscal
behavior. He explains the rise of public debt after 1973 by the collapse of the
Bretton Woods system and the modified restrictions for fiscal policy arising from
the transition to floating exchange rates. This idea is tested below by the exchange
rate regime variable FLOATING that for each country counts the number of years
between 1970 and 1997 with a floating exchange rate regime. Data on the exchange
rate regime originate also from Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.
                                       
3 These countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France,
Great Britain, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, New
Zealand, Portugal, Sweden and the United States.
7A combination of cluster and discriminant analysis is the tool for the empirical work
(BACKHAUS et al., 1996). In a first step cluster analysis serves the purpose to identify
classes of countries that are largely homogeneous in relation to changes of fiscal
variables since the 1970s. In a second step discriminant analysis is used to decide
whether the globalization variables can be helpful for explaining the cluster
structure. This two-step-procedure is applied for each of the four public finance
dimensions as described above.
Description of the applied cluster and discriminant methodology
Cluster analysis is a descriptive instrument. The aim is classification. A sample of
objects is classified into subgroups (clusters) with a high degree of within
homogeneity and a high degree of between heterogeneity. The classification is
performed by taking account of specified features of the objects. On the basis of
these features, distances between objects and clusters can be measured if a criterion
for distance is defined.
Given the objects (21 OECD countries – due to data availability not all are included
in each analytical step) and the features (the above discussed four public finance
dimensions), the standard approach of agglomerative clustering is used. This
approach starts with each individual case being a cluster on its own. It proceeds by
successively merging those two clusters with the lowest degree of dissimilarity until
all cases are combined into one cluster. Results of this agglomerative procedure are
summarized in the dendrogram. The dendrogram is a helpful tool in deciding the
adequate number of clusters by depicting for each step the extent of the dissimilarity
coefficient for those clusters that are combined. A significant jump in this coefficient
indicates that this agglomerating step leads to a combination of dissimilar classes.
The following methodological specifications are used: As measure of distance the
Euclidean distance is chosen. Dissimilarity between clusters is assessed according to
the concept of average linkage, i.e. distance between clusters is calculated as the
average of distances between single cases. In order to preclude scale effects,
variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a variance of 1 before executing
the agglomerating procedure.
After classification is done by cluster analysis, discriminant analysis follows.
Discriminant analysis helps to answer the following question: Which variables are
helpful to decide whether an object belongs to a certain class? Thus it is the logical
next step in the attempt to look into the impact of globalization on government
budgets. While cluster analysis helps to identify country clusters with similar fiscal
developments, discriminant analysis helps to find out whether these similarities can
be explained by those variables that are proxies for the intensity of globalization.
In the procedure a discriminant function is calculated. The coefficients are
determined in order to minimize for the discriminant function the ratio between the
8sum of squares within a given group and the sum of squares between given groups.
The goodness of the discriminant function in regard to its capability to discriminate
between groups is assessed by Wilk’s Lambda, which is defined to be the ratio
between the sum of squares within the groups and the total sum of squares. Thus a
small statistic stands for a high goodness of discrimination. Wilk’s Lambda can be
transformed into a chi-square distributed variable. Therefore, the zero hypothesis
that groups are not different with respect to the values of the discriminant function
can be tested.
The maximum number of discriminant functions is equal to the number of groups
less 1 or the number of discriminant variables, depending which value is smaller. In
the analysis the maximum number of functions included is two due to the fact that
with a higher number the marginal improvement in the goodness of the
discrimination is very low. Only one function can be determined if only one
explanatory variable is used. This can happen because the discriminant analysis is
performed stepwise. Consecutively one after the other potential globalization
variable is included. Wilk’s Lambda is used as the criterion for the order of inclusion
and for the decision whether a variable is included at all. A variable is not included
if there is no significant reduction of Wilk’s Lambda at a significance level of 5
percent. A further criterion to assess the goodness of discrimination is the percentage
share of cases that would be classified correctly on the basis of the discriminant
functions. Apart from that results of an F-test for significant differences in the
cluster means of globalization variables are reported.
Taking account of starting levels
In addition to the globalization variables, starting levels of the fiscal variables will
be included among the discriminating variables. It is plausible to expect the intensity
of globalization pressure to depend also on the initial situation before the opening of
a country. A country with a relatively high tax burden on companies should for
example show a more marked reduction of this burden once globalization starts than
a country where the initial burden is low.
4 Results of Cluster and Discriminant Analysis
4.1 Tax Structure Hypothesis
The presumption of the theoretical literature is that globalization leads to a shift of
tax burden from mobile to immobile factors. Since companies are more mobile than
consumers this effect should result in decreasing company taxes and increasing
indirect taxes as shares of total taxation. Figure 1 depicts the changes of these shares
from the average value of the 1970s to the average value of the 1990s (until 1997).
9The theoretical presumption would be supported if countries in the Northwest
segment were highly and countries in the Southeast lowly globalized.
The data do not fit easily into this pattern because there is no clear cluster structure
along the Northwest-Southeast direction. On the basis of the dendrogram in Figure 2
a five cluster structure seems appropriate. A further merger of clusters would imply
a large increase in the measure of distance.
Three outlier clusters are identified: Norway is characterized by a strong increase in
the corporate tax share, obviously a Northsea oil effect. Great Britain, Luxemburg
and New Zealand are characterized by an increasing share of indirect taxation but do
not form a common cluster because of the fact that in Britain corporate tax share
increased while it decreased in Luxemburg and New Zealand. USA, Canada and
Japan form a southwest cluster being characterized by a relative strong decrease of
corporate taxation, while the remaining 14 (apart from Australia exclusively
European) countries are combined to a central cluster with a slight average increase
of corporate tax shares and a clear decrease of indirect tax shares. It is interesting to
see that the long-run perspective which is applied here leads to different findings on
indirect tax shares which according to the studies cited in section 2 are generally
increasing in a more short-run perspective.
In the next step it is tried to discriminate between clusters on the basis of the
globalization indicators. Due to non-availability of data for Portugal and Luxemburg
discrimant analysis can be applied to 19 countries. In the further analysis outliers are
excluded and the focus is thus on discriminating between the southwest cluster
USA, Japan, Canada (decreasing corporate tax share) and the central mainly
European country cluster (slight increase of corporate tax share).
In line with the tax structure hypothesis the southwest cluster has significantly less
restrictions than the central cluster (Tables 1 and 2). It is also characterized by a
significant predominance of floating exchange rates. Differences in openness
between both clusters are not significant at the 5 percent level. This result carries
over to the discrimination procedure, where OPENNESS is not included as a
significant discriminating variable. The discrimination on the basis of FLOATING
and RESTRICTIONS is, however, successful and leads to a correct classification of
15 out of a total of 16 cases (Table 3).
The finding that globalization variables are relevant is not robust in regard to taking
account of catching up effects. The inclusion of the start levels of corporate and
good tax shares leads to the following (not reported) results: Only the start level of
the corporate tax share survives the stepwise procedure and leads to a good
discrimination between both clusters. Those countries that initially had high
corporate tax shares reduced the burden for corporate income.
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Thus, these findings show some support for the tax structure hypothesis though not
in an overwhelming way.
Figure 1: Changes in Tax Structure
Figure 2: Dendrogram Agglomerative Clustering –Tax Structure Dimension
                           Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine
                   0         5        10        15        20        25
                   +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+
  AUS               -+
  SWE               -+
  NLD               -+---+
  GRC               -+   +---+
  ESP               -+---+   I
  GER               -+       +---------------+
  IRE               -+-----+ I               I
  ITA               -+     I I               I
  BEL               -+-+   +-+               I
  SWI               -+ +-+ I                 I
  DNK               -+ I I I                 +-------------------+
  FIN               -+-+ +-+                 I                   I
  AUT               -+   I                   I                   I
  FRA               -----+                   I                   I
  CAN               ---+---+                 I                   +---+
  JPN               ---+   +-----------------+                   I   I
  USA               -------+                                     I   I
  LUX               -----+-----------+                           I   I
  NZL               -----+           +---------------------------+   I
  GBR               -----------------+                               I
  NOR               -------------------------------------------------+
SOUTHWEST
CENTRAL
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Clusters (2 Clusters –Tax Structure Dimension)
CLUSTER GLOBALIZATION
VARIABLE
MEAN STANDARD
DEVIATION
SOUTHWEST OPENNESS 31.04 19.17
3 CASES RESTRICTIONS 4.06 7.02
FLOATING 23.33 4.04
OPENNESS 64.49 30.45
RESTRICTIONS 36.47 21.37
CENTRAL
13 CASES
FLOATING 3.31 7.52
Table 2: F-Test for Equality of Group Means (2 Clusters –Tax Structure Dimension)
F DF1 DF2 SIGNIFICANCE
OPENNESS 3.412 1 14 0.086
RESTRICTIONS 6.427 1 14 0.024
FLOATING 13.904 1 14 0.002
Table 3: Results of Discriminant Analysis (2 Clusters –Tax Structure Dimension)
NUMBER
INCLUDED
CASES
NUMBER
DISCRIMINANT
FUNCTIONS
VARIABLES INCLUDED
AFTER STEPWISE
PROCEDURE
WILK’S
LAMBDA
SIGNIFICANCE
OF
DISCRIMINATION
%-SHARE
CORRECT
CLASSIFICATIONS
18 1 FLOATING
RESTRICTIONS
0.247 0.000 93.8
4.2 Expenditure Structure Hypothesis
Theory suggests that public expenditure structure should increasingly reflect the
needs of mobile factors when integration increases. Expenditure shares of social
security spending and of public investment outlays can serve as indicators. Given a
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fixed size of the budget and a fixed revenue structure, a country can try to become
more attractive for mobile and taxpaying factors by reducing social spending and
increasing the quality of infrastructure.
Denmark, Luxemburg and New Zealand are not included in this analysis due to
missing data. Figure 3 depicts the changes along these two dimensions from the 70s
to the 90s for 18 countries (decade averages). The absolute values of changes are
remarkable: There is no country where investment shares have been increased. On
the contrary, there have been marked reductions in relative spending on public
infrastructure. The opposite is true for social spending where for most countries
expenditure shares have risen strongly reflecting the growth of the welfare state.
Thus, if globalization has an impact on expenditure structure this refers to the
question whether it has served to limit the relative (and even larger absolute) growth
of social security spending and the relative shrinking of public investment. In the
country cross-section a higher/lower degree of globalization should be associated
with a location in the northwest/southeast of figure 3.
Cluster analysis recommends a 5 cluster structure with two single case clusters USA
and Ireland (Figure 4). A South European cluster (Italy, Spain, Greece and France)
is identified in the northwest, a Middle European cluster (Germany, Netherlands,
Belgium and Austria) in the west and a worldwide cluster in the east. Dropping
single case clusters, discrimination analysis between clusters is successful on the
basis of the globalization variables RESTRICTIONS and OPENNESS while the
exchange rate regime variable is rejected (Table 6). However, the impact of
globalization has not always the direction predicted by theory: Contrary to theory
the northwest cluster where the growth of social security spending and the shrinkage
of investment expenditure was limited is the least globalized cluster (most
restrictions and lowest openness, Table 4; Table 5 shows that cluster differences of
means are significant for all three globalization variables). The east cluster shows a
high relative increase of social spending while it has about average values of
restrictions and openness. The most globalized cluster is the Middle European one
which in line with theoretical prediction shows a slight decrease of relative social
security spending. But at the same time it is characterized by a particular large drop
of investment spending.
The findings are robust to the inclusion of the starting levels of investment and
social security shares in the 1970s (results not reported; these findings show that the
countries with an initially low share of social spending tended to be also the
countries that have increased this share in the last two decades). As a whole the
expenditure structure hypothesis is not supported by these findings.
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Figure 3: Changes in Expenditure Structure
Figure 4: Dendrogram Agglomerative Clustering –Expenditure Structure Dimension
                           Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine
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  FRA               ---+---------------------+         I             I
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of Clusters (3 Clusters –Expenditure Structure Dimension)
CLUSTER GLOBALIZATION
VARIABLE
MEAN STANDARD
DEVIATION
EAST OPENNESS 53.09 18.00
8 CASES RESTRICTIONS 29.15 19.96
FLOATING 15.63 8.88
OPENNESS 89.18 32.60
RESTRICTIONS 16.29 15.00
WEST
4 CASES
FLOATING 0.00 0.00
OPENNESS 40.66 2.62
RESTRICTIONS 59.63 12.08
NORTHWEST
4 CASES
FLOATING 12.50 6.35
Table 5: F-Test for Equality of Group Means (3 Clusters – Expenditure Structure Dimension)
F DF1 DF2 SIGNIFICANCE
OPENNESS 6.252 2 13 0.013
RESTRICTIONS 6.774 2 13 0.010
FLOATING 6.415 2 13 0.012
Table 6: Results of Discriminant Analysis (3 Clusters –Expenditure Structure Dimension)
NUMBER
INCLUDED
CASES
NUMBER
DISCRIMINANT
FUNCTIONS
VARIABLES
INCLUDED  AFTER
STEPWISE
PROCEDURE
WILK’S
LAMBDA
SIGNIFICANCE
OF
DISCRIMINATIO
N
%-SHARE
CORRECT
CLASSIFICATION
S
16 2 RESTRICTIONS
OPENNESS
0.192 0.000 87.5
15
4.3 Public Debt Hypothesis
Can increasing globalization be helpful to discipline fiscal politicians in regard to
the extent of deficit financing? If this is the case countries with an early
liberalization of international transactions should consequently have lower deficits
and/or lower increases of the debt level. Figure 5 depicts changes of two public debt
variables, the debt GDP ratio and the primary surplus. Changes refer to the
difference between the average of the 70s and of the 90s. In this analytical step,
Australia, Denmark, Luxemburg and New Zealand are not included due to missing
data.
With Great Britain and Norway only two countries resisted the general tendency
towards a huge buildup of public debt in the last decades. The increase of the stock
of debt was paralleled by wide differences in the development of flows: A number
of countries experienced a large improvement of the primary surplus. The logic
behind this development is obvious: A country with a large increase in the debt level
and consequently rising interest rate payments is forced to improve the primary
balance even if it only targets at stabilizing the debt ratio.
According to the dendrogram cluster analysis seems to suggest a number of 4 to 6
clusters to be appropriate (Figure 6). In the following the analysis is based on a 4
cluster structure, the main results are however robust to a finer differentiation.
Besides the outlier Ireland which is dropped before applying discriminant analysis 3
clusters along the debt level dimension are identified. The northern cluster combines
Greece, Belgium and Italy as those countries with an exploding debt level. The
southern cluster combines Great Britain and Norway being the countries resisting
debt increases. The remaining countries are integrated into the central cluster with a
medium debt performance.
The high debt increase country group is also the cluster where restrictions on
international transactions were most frequent (Table 7). However, neither the
difference of RESTRICTIONS nor of OPENNESS or FLOATING prove significant
between clusters (Table 8). Consistent with this result all these variables are rejected
in the stepwise procedure as not useful for discrimination at the 5 percent level of
significance (results not reported).
According to these results in the last decades debt policy has not been subject to
significant globalization constraints.
16
Figure 5: Changes of Debt Level and Primary Surplus
Figure 6: Dendrogram Agglomerative Clustering – Public Debt Dimension
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Table 7 Descriptive Statistics of Clusters (3 Clusters – Public Debt Dimension)
CLUSTER GLOBALIZATION
VARIABLE
MEAN STANDARD
DEVIATION
NORTH OPENNESS 69.21 48.79
3 CASES RESTRICTIONS 56.61 21.93
FLOATING 10.33 9.61
OPENNESS 53.52 24.34
RESTRICTIONS 23.88 22.95
CENTRAL
11 CASES
FLOATING 10.55 9.84
OPENNESS 65.92 19.33
RESTRICTIONS 37.67 13.67
SOUTH
2 CASES
FLOATING 14 12.73
Table 8: F-Test for Equality of Group Means (3 Clusters – Public Debt Dimension)
F DF1 DF2 SIGNIFICANCE
OPENNESS 0425 2 13 0.662
RESTRICTIONS 2.640 2 13 0.109
FLOATING 0.106 2 13 0.900
4.4 Size Hypothesis
The final testing concerns the evolution of the size of government. Figure 7 depicts
the change of the tax-GDP-ratio (taxes including social security contributions) and
the change of the ratio between government outlays and GDP. The change is the
difference between the average level of the 70s and the average of the 90s (up to
1997). Data availability allows for the inclusion of 18 countries (excluded are
Denmark, Luxemburg and New Zealand). Obviously, a departure from the 45-
degree-line to the right indicates that growth of outlays is not paralleled by growth
of tax revenues.
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It is important to note that the growth of public activity according to these indicators
has been substantial. This corresponds to the findings cited in section 2 that there are
no signs of a shrinking state in the era of globalization. A statement parallel to the
results for the expenditure structure and the growth of social security spending
applies: If globalization has an impact this refers to the question whether it has
served to limit growth of public outlays and taxes.
Cluster analysis leads to straightforward results. The dendrogram in Figure 8
recommends a 2 cluster structure. 5 countries (Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy and
Finland) form the northeast cluster with high growth of public activities, the
remaining 13 countries form the low growth southwest cluster. Comparing both
clusters in regard to globalization variables only the difference in the number of
restrictions is significant: The countries of the northeast high growth cluster have
been more restrictive on international transactions (Tables 9 and 10).
As in the preceding section only the RESTRICTIONS variable turns out to be useful
in the discriminant analysis (Table 11). Wilk’s lambda indicates a significant
discrimination function on the basis of this variable alone. Three quarter of cases are
correctly classified. Neither OPENNESS nor FLOATING leads to a significant
improvement of the discrimination.
Robustness was checked by the inclusion of the initial levels of taxes and outlays in
the stepwise discriminating procedure in order to control for the existence of a
catching up process in government activity (results not reported). The catching up
presumption is confirmed: The initial level of government outlays is helpful to
discriminate. At the same time, the discriminating power of the RESTRICTIONS
variable is not reduced, it remains important – even more important than the
catching up variable.
These results are in line with the size hypothesis. Governments of countries that
liberalized international transactions early were not able to increase outlays and
taxes to a similar extent as the governments in countries with continuing restrictions.
Due to the generally positive sign of changes this does, however, not support the
hypothesis of liberalization undermining the financial basis for the modern fiscal
state.
19
Figure 7: Changes in Levels of Public Revenues and Outlays
Figure 8: Dendrogram Agglomerative Clustering – Size Dimension
                   Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine
                   0         5        10        15        20        25
                   +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+
  AUS               -+
  NLD               -+
  BEL               -+-+
  GER               -+ +-------+
  NOR               -+ I       I
  GBR               -+-+       +---+
  USA               -+         I   I
  IRE               -----------+   +---------------------------------+
  FRA               -+---+         I                                 I
  SWE               -+   +---------+                                 I
  AUT               -+-+ I                                           I
  JPN               -+ +-+                                           I
  CAN               ---+                                             I
  GRC               -+-+                                             I
  PRT               -+ I                                             I
  ESP               ---+---+                                         I
  ITA               ---+   +-----------------------------------------+
  FIN               -------+
NORTHEAST
SOUTHWEST
20
Table 9: Descriptive Statistics of Clusters (2 Clusters –Size Dimension)
CLUSTER GLOBALIZATION
VARIABLE
MEAN STANDARD
DEVIATION
SOUTHWEST OPENNESS 64.0688 33.7860
13 CASES RESTRICTIONS 23.7308 18.9958
FLOATING 9.6923 10.8042
OPENNESS 48.2199 12.0460
RESTRICTIONS 56.4333 18.0495
NORTHEAST
5 CASES
FLOATING 13.6000 4.0373
Table 10: F-Test for Equality of Group Means (2 Clusters –Size Dimension)
F DF1 DF2 SIGNIFICANCE
OPENNESS 1.016 1 16 .328
RESTRICTIONS 10.969 1 16 .004
FLOATING .602 1 16 .449
Table 11: Results of Discriminant Analysis (2 Clusters –Size Dimension)
NUMBER
INCLUDED
CASES
NUMBER
DISCRIMINANT
FUNCTIONS
VARIABLES INCLUDED
AFTER STEPWISE
PROCEDURE
WILK’S
LAMBDA
SIGNIFICANCE
OF
DISCRIMINATION
%-SHARE
CORRECT
CLASSIFICATIONS
18 1 RESTRICTIONS 0.593 0.0045 77.8
5 Conclusion
The above findings show the existence of interrelations between globalization and
government budgets in the OECD. These links are not equally strong for all
budgetary dimensions. The clearest evidence concerns the size of the budget. It is
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affected as predicted by theory. Countries with an early liberalization of
international transactions had lower increases of government outlays and taxes.
Nevertheless, even for the liberal countries there was relative to GDP a substantial
increase of government activity since the 1970s. This fact is worth to be underlined
since it contradicts the theoretical prediction of global markets undermining the
welfare state. The abolition of barriers to the free flow of factors has limited the
growth of the welfare state, but this growth remained positive with high rates of
expansion.
Compatibility of welfare state and globalization is also impressively demonstrated
by the findings concerning expenditure structure where public investment has been
reduced and social security expenditure shares have been increased. National
differences from this general tendency do not in all cases correspond to the relative
speed of opening. Those countries for which expenditure shift to social security has
been relatively small are even the countries that have been most reluctant to lift
restrictions on international transactions.
Concerning revenue structure there is some support for the predictions of tax
competition theory. Those countries that have been more globalized than others have
tended to shift relative tax burdens away from corporate income. Combined with the
fact of a high growth of government and especially social spending this indicates the
following: With globalization there are limits to finance an increasing welfare state
by higher tax burdens on mobile factors.
The results concerning public debt are disappointing for those who hope that open
capital markets can have a helpful disciplining function in the presence of the deficit
bias of modern democracies.  There is no indication that the abolition of capital
restrictions has limited the buildup of large debt levels since the 1970s. Different
clusters of debt performance can not be discriminated on the basis of globalization
variables.
The relative performance of the three globalization variables might offer some
indications in regard to the channel over which global integration influences
budgetary policy. The exchange rate regime and the openness variable are almost
always rejected in the discrimination procedure. This contrasts to the impact of the
variable counting the number of restrictions on international transactions. It seems
that a liberal approach towards a free flow of capital and goods is a more important
restriction for fiscal policy makers than the exchange rate regime or the size of
international trade.
Summing up the message of this analysis is: Globalization does indeed matter for
government budgets but substantial leeway for an individual budgetary policy of
national countries is kept.
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